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CRUSOE'S FARTHER ADVENTURES: 
DISCOVERY, TRADE, AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 
Anna Neill 
At the end of The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures, Crusoe sug-
gests that he may follow his story of the discovery, defense, and settle-
ment of his island with an account of the struggles which his successors 
later endured as they endeavored to preserve peace in the new colony. 
The Caribbeans, he summarizes, returned to invade the settlers and 
ruin their plantations; the English villains he had left on the island 
were subjected to the Spaniards though used honestly and fairly by 
them; the island itself was further planted and improved; and Crusoe 
himself returned to give the colonists supplies and to divvy up property 
and administrative responsibility among them. Of all this, together with 
"some new adventures of my own for ten years more," he tentatively 
promises to give an account. What he does not advertise in any detail 
are other episodes in The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, in which 
he travels on from the island around the Cape of Good Hope, past 
Madagascar, up toward the East Indies and the Pacific, overland 
through China and Tartar to Europe, and finally back to England. On 
this later voyage he continues to reflect, as he did in the first part of 
Robinson Crusoe, on the imprudence of an adventurer's life. The dif-
ference here is that he interprets his misfortunes not so much as the 
just consequences of an original act of disobedience against his father, 
but as the result of his behaving like a reckless wanderer, journeying 
to places where he has "no business,"1 rather than like a responsible 
British merchant, who might secure, plant, and settle new territories 
"in the name of England" (216). A merchant, Defoe will elsewhere 
suggest, can, in the interests of trade, legitimately establish himself on 
foreign "uninhabited" soil. An adventurer who claims sovereignty over 
the territories he discovers, on the other hand, respects neither the 
interests of his own nation, nor the authority of those natural laws 
which regulate relations between different nations. As aimless ex-
plorer, as absolute ruler of the island, and as self-appointed prosecutor 
and judge of both his cannibal and his mutineer subjects, Crusoe is 
something more and less than a law-abiding citizen of his country and 
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of the ("civilized") world. The Farther Adventures begins where Robinson 
Crusoe 2 left off, setting the relationship between patriarchal govern-
ment and colonial plantation and settlement in the context of larger 
questions about sovereignty and the law of nations. 
Crusoe's journey beyond the colonial Caribbean and into the com-
mercial Indian and Pacific Oceans, then, will be one in which he 
learns that absolute colonial rule is in conflict with national duty as 
well as with the "international law" which regulates colonial trade.3 In 
the course of his later adventures we discover that in the colonized 
world it is not cannibalism, as Crusoe had hitherto believed, but willful 
isolation that most offends the natural laws regulating contact be-
tween different peoples. Commercial relationships, on the other 
hand, whether between individuals, tribes, or states, are the civilized 
means to the material end of acquiring certain otherwise unobtain-
able goods and relieving oneself or one's community of a surplus of oth-
ers. In what follows I will situate Crusoe's education out of the hubris 
of adventuring (and into the responsibilities of a British trader) in the 
context of a growing recognition that the accumulation of national 
wealth takes place in a global arena of exchange. This will be to argue 
that the Farther Adventures subscribes to a model of inter-state relations 
in which this accumulation can proceed "naturally," uninhibited, that 
is to say, by the protective jealousies of isolated peoples.4 
If, as Benedict Anderson has argued, political communities calling 
themselves "nations"—communities shaped by systems of horizontal 
comradeship rather than vertical relations of power—were first brought 
imaginatively into being in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, 
then these in turn must have enabled the imagining of a new, federa-
tive society of nations.5 To identify the most powerful influences on 
social and political life in Britain alone during this period—the chang-
ing relationship between King and subject, the growth of parliamen-
tary authority, and the expansion of trade and empire—is to consider 
how questions of state practice were tied to those of national sovereignty 
as the modern institution of the nation-state freed itself from older, 
more centralized structures of power in Europe. In the wake of the Ref-
ormation, states began to see themselves as existing in free and equal 
relationship with other, equally independent states.6 This "comrade-
ship" necessitated an articulation of the set of rights which one nation-
state held against another, not least in order to settle the inter-European 
legal questions that arose in response to the colonization of and es-
tablishment of trading rights within newly discovered territories. The 
nation was brought imaginatively into being, that is to say, not only in 
the insubstantial connections which its members were able to establish 
with one another, nor even in the jealousies which they then developed 
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against the members of other nations. It was also the product of a cos-
mopolitan spirit which enabled a whole people to see itself as both sub-
ject and beneficiary of laws, rights, and international peace. 
Nationalism, Ernest Gellner has shown, is part of a web of political, 
social, and psychological responses to industrialization.7 Anderson, 
with rather more emphasis on the agency of the national subject, ar-
gues that the nation is apprehended, thought, or "imagined" in the 
wake of historical upheavals such as decline of dynastic government, 
the fragmenting of religious communities formerly bound together by 
sacred languages, and the emergence of a secular model of time.8 What 
it is also important to recognize is that, whether imposed by social and 
economic change or stimulated from below by those emancipated by 
such change, discourses of nationalism are historically intimate with 
those of liberalism and enlightenment cosmopolitanism. The nation, 
like the individual, is a subject of natural right and law. Rather than 
jealous and "tribal," nations are expressions of Reason, Law, and Peace. 
Of course, as Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History demonstrate, 
this means that only certain peoples (Hegel is not alone in identifying 
these as being from the temperate zones of the northern hemisphere) 
can be identified as enlightened subjects of history belonging to na-
tions.9 Nationalism in this sense could scarcely have less to do with eth-
nic rivalry. It belongs to that aspect of enlightenment history concerned 
with drawing careful distinctions between primitive and modern so-
cieties, and hence with determining who is or is not capable of mem-
bership in a "civil society" of nations. 
This coincidence of nation with modern inter-nationhood, then, has 
two important dimensions. The first is a theory of cosmopolitan right, 
which from Grotius's The Bights of War to Kant's Perpetual Peace involves 
the reconciliation of political prudence—the sovereign's acting in the 
interests of the nation—with reason, to which the use of force by one 
nation which deprives another of its right is repugnant. The second 
dimension is an account of the evolution of government and culture 
in which some societies are seen as more entitled to be bearers of this 
cosmopolitan right than others. Since the nation is the primary unit 
of international law, the problem of how "pre" or "sub" national com-
munities can be bearers of right in relation to greater powers neces-
sarily haunts the law in the form of the Hobbesian state of nature: a 
primitive, disordered "society" ruled by passion rather than reason. 
Hobbes's savage is drawn into civil community precisely because he is 
so destitute of reason, and only his subjection to absolute authority 
will guarantee his safety from the violence of others equally driven by 
their passions. Although as theorists of natural law both Grotius and 
Pufendorf deny that human beings are essentially and originally at war 
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with one another, each imagines a state of war where men are jealous 
and irrational as the state which predates both the well-ordered society 
and any organized federation of societies. For Grotius, "no beings ex-
cept those that can form general maxims are capable of right."10 Al-
though he argues with Hobbes that the natural state is one of peace, 
Pufendorf agrees that "those who are governed purely by appetite are 
incapable of right or law."11 That is to say, what comes to be identified 
after the civil war as the Hobbesian state of nature is figured at two lev-
els in the discourse of cosmopolitan right. The first level is that of the 
improperly jealous and aggressive behavior of nations who illegally 
make war on others in order to advance their own interests (at the ex-
pense of those of their neighbors). The second is that of the pre-civil 
society whose ignorance of the fundamental principles of property 
and right disqualifies it from the protection of international law. 
While he doubts that any people so entirely uncivilized can be found 
anywhere, Grotius in principle denies such people could be the bear-
ers of right: 
Neither moral nor religious virtue, not any intellectual excellence is required to 
form a good tide to property. Only where a race of men is so destitute of reason as 
to be incapable of exercising any act of ownership, they can hold no property, nor 
will the law of charity require that they should have more than the necessaries of 
life. For the rules of the law of nations can only be applied to those, who are capable 
of political or commercial intercourse, but not to a people destitute of reason. 
{Rights of War, 3:39) 
Grotius's defense of the dispossession of barbarous societies here 
seems at first inconsistent with his earlier claim for the political rights 
of first peoples in The Freedom of the Seas (1608). In this work he defends 
the right of the Dutch to make trading voyages to those parts of the 
East Indies where the Portuguese prohibited other European powers 
free passage. In the course of this defense he points out that islands 
which have always "had their own government, their own laws, and their 
own legal systems" cannot be subjected to the authority of a foreign 
sovereign, and that therefore their original inhabitants may allow the 
privilege of trade to any other nation they wish; the Portuguese, there-
fore, are not sovereigns but foreigners in those lands.12 By the same 
token, he argues, a people cannot be deprived of their sovereignty for 
being ignorant of Christ, since "sovereignty is a matter of positive law 
and unbelief is a matter of divine law, which cannot annul positive law" 
(Freedom, 20). Colonial powers, therefore, cannot base their claims to 
dominion either on discovery or on a supposed right of conquest of 
savage peoples unwilling to acknowledge the doctrine of the true 
faith. Discovery does not carry any automatic right of occupation, and 
heathen rulers are still legitimate rulers. 
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At the same time, however, the very basis upon which he argues that 
European powers have limited jurisdiction in foreign territories be-
comes tied up with a historicized account of the legal origins of politi-
cal and commercial sovereignty. Grotius identifies two stages in the 
natural law as it is applied to the law of nations. The first is the primary 
or "primitive" law, under which everything is acquired in common and 
held as a community of goods, "fields [are] not delimited by boundary 
lines," and "there [is] no commercial intercourse" (23). Here no man 
has any particular right. A "nation," by this primitive law, is simply un-
derstood as a collection of individuals who collectively own both the 
land which they occupy as a group and the objects which they have 
for their common use. The secondary law of nations involves the mod-
ern distinction of ownership, both as private property—that which is in-
dividually owned—and public property, or that which belongs to a 
nation. The concept of property, then, must be contemporary with the 
emergence of states. This marking out of boundaries, Grotius tells us, 
"did not come violently, but gradually, nature herself pointing the way" 
(23), as the consumable properties of a thing—that which could be eaten 
or drunk, worn or used in any other way—made it by nature the prop-
erty of the person who used it. This notion of property as the object of 
bodily needs then necessitated a theory of ownership by occupation. 
Public property is that which satisfies the needs of a whole nation. In 
its modern, positive sense, the nation must be recognized as that which 
has marked out territory as its own, some of which remains public (the 
private property of a nation), and some of which is the property of in-
dividuals. 
As the institutions of public and private property emerge, Grotius 
argues, the law of nations establishes a distinction between natural ob-
jects that are available for appropriation and those that are not. While 
rivers and inlets may be seen as part of the national territory, the sea 
can never belong to any particular nation since its natural properties 
prevent it from being seized or enclosed, and any boundary estab-
lished in it can only ever be an "imaginary line" (39). This designation 
of ocean as the common property of all, coincides with another posi-
tive (secondary) law of nature, which recognizes that, although all things 
were originally given to all human beings in common, men living far 
apart from one another rely on commerce to provide them with many 
of the goods which they need or desire. He cites Aristotle in the asser-
tion that "the art of exchange is a completion of the independence 
which nature requires" (61), and Seneca that "buying and selling is the 
law of nations" (63). This suggests that what remains under the juris-
diction of the primitive law of nations—that which is held in common 
by all men—is entirely encased in the secondary law which seeks above 
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all to protect commercial relations between both individuals and 
states. Only nations in the positive sense are fully respectful of natural 
law. It is at this point that we can return to the claim that a people who 
are "incapable of political or commercial intercourse" cannot be rec-
ognized as beneficiaries of cosmopolitan right. Those who subscribe 
to the primitive law of nations are not properly speaking nations at all. 
Hence it is not on the basis of belief or government, but on property 
and trade that a colonizing power might become the bearer of right 
where a subjected people cannot. 
Like Grotius, Pufendorf argues the reverse of Hobbes, insisting that 
men are naturally peaceful, not hostile. Anticipating Locke, he also 
identifies natural man evolving into a man of property, appropriating 
moveable things for himself out of the store of common goods, and 
taking what land he needs into his possession. Land belongs to those 
who "manure . . . and improve" it, the rest, he concludes, "being left 
in its natural and negative communion to be possessed by any person 
that should afterwards think fit to use it" (Law of Nature, 367). While 
he suggests that the decision about whether the sea should be appro-
priated or remain in its primitive state is not made absolutely by na-
ture, he does confirm that those who try to turn a thing into property 
which is peacefully used in common, like the ocean, should be seen 
as antagonists to the Peace of Mankind, and hence to the law of na-
ture. "To sail the ocean in a peaceful manner ought to be the free privi-
lege of all nations" (384). It is also conducive to the common peace, 
he suggests, that properties should be made of moveable things such 
as can be improved by the labor of men. Peace is promoted, Grotius 
and Pufendorf agree, by the productive enclosure of land and by the 
protection of open trade routes. 
Natural law theory, then, identifies nationhood at two levels: in the 
exercising of sovereignty over a particular territory which can be ap-
propriated either as public or as private property; and in communica-
tion and commercial interaction between peoples. These two aspects 
of nationhood are, of course, interdependent. Under the law of na-
ture men appropriate land and moveables not only for their immedi-
ate use, but also in order that they can exchange these goods for others 
which they need. Just as individual right is realized in the appropria-
tion of land and goods, and in commercial relationships with others 
based on a mutual respect for property, nations as bearers of right come 
into existence through their relation to other nations—and this relation-
ship, although it may at times be aggressive, is by nature peaceful.13 
It is interesting in this context to look briefly at two pieces by Defoe 
that address the relationship between trade and national identity. The 
True Born Englishman turns the tables on William Ill's opponents by 
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arguing that indigeneity has not historically been the basis for English-
ness; that "blood" cannot be the source of nationalism since it reveals 
both a heterogeneous as well as a sexually and politically dishonorable 
history: 
Thus from a Mixture of all Kinds began 
That het'rogeneous Thing, An Englishman: 
In eager Rapes, and furious Lust begot, 
Betwixt a Painted Britton and a Scot 
Whose gend'ring Offspring quickly learnt to Plough: 
And yoke their Heifers to the Roman Plough: 
From whence a Mongrel half-bred Race there came 
With neither Name nor Nation, Speech nor Fame.14 
If "Englishness" is xenophobically determined by blood then it is 
located not only in a history of defeat and subjection, but also, more 
ironically still, in one of miscegenation. If membership in the nation 
is based on race then the term "English" is a meaningless one. 
Although Defoe sets out to satirize James* supporters for being most 
un-English in precisely the terms in which they identify William—as 
racially impure—he ends up advocating a model of nationhood 
based rather closely on what is calculated to most embarrass his 
satirical targets. "England, modern to the last degree / Borrows or 
makes her own nobility" (404-5). Since claims to legitimacy based 
on blood, the "fame of families" (1214), are a sham, then "'Tis 
personal Virtue only makes us great" (1216). National identity and 
glory are both discovered in the process of self-invention which is 
associated with England's modernity. 
Since it is of the order of the national, this greatness is tied to a sense 
of England's place in the larger community of nations. In defending 
William's right to the throne, Defoe suggests in the Preface, he may 
be wrongly taken for a Dutchman. He is, however, "one that would be 
glad to see Englishmen behave themselves better to strangers, and to 
governors also; that one might not be reproached in foreign countries 
for belonging to a nation that wants manners." Here Defoe is not a patriot 
of any particular nation but a cosmopolitan critic who corrects the in-
civility of the jealous or arrogant traveler. The English would do better 
abroad if they understood and respected the customs of other nations. 
It is in this "ambassadorial" role that his nationalism is located. 
If the role of cosmopolitan critic is actively that of the satirist it is 
only incidentally that of the merchant. Defoe's glorifying of com-
merce and polite communication between nations over an arrogance 
and jealousy that is more strictly understood as patriotism is slightly 
differently expressed in The Complete English Tradesman (1738). Here 
he begins by describing the necessarily self-interested character of 
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commercial men. A tradesman cannot be a public figure; he who en-
gages in party debate, joins clubs, and studies politics will end up a 
bankrupt; a "good patriot" is a "bad shopkeeper."15 Yet although the 
tradesman must confine himself to his own sphere, he should be "ca-
pable of making a general judgment of things" in order to defend him-
self against projectors (16), and know all the inland trade of England 
so as to be able to turn his hand to any aspect of manufacture in his 
country. By pursuing his own interests honestly, thoroughly, and pru-
dently, he contributes more than anyone else to England's glory—a 
glory which is derived from its being "the greatest trading country in 
the world" (174), exporting, importing, and consuming more of the 
growth and product of its own and others' land and manufacture than 
any other nation. Despite its private character, "trade is a public bene-
fit" (304). Defoe's anti-mercantilist, economically modern approach 
to trade is the descendant of Grotius's natural law: foreign trade, he 
suggests, is a supplement to the invention of property—essential to 
the prosperity and security of nations: "no land is fully improved 'till 
it is made to yield its utmost increase: but if our lands should be made 
to yield their utmost increase, and your people cannot consume it, or 
foreign trade take it off your hands . . . the lands must be laid down . 
. . and left to bear no corn, or feed no cattle, because your produce is 
too great for your consumption" (301). 
Land is put to waste not only in the absence of a domestic market 
for what it yields, but also when foreign trade languishes. The trades-
man, for Defoe, is a prototype of the merchant, since he ought to "un-
derstand all the languages of trade within the circumference of his own 
country . . . [just] as a merchant should understand at least the lan-
guages of those countries which he trades to, or corresponds with, and 
the customs and usages of those countries as to their commerce" (14). 
Furthermore, "by trade we must be understood to include navigation 
and foreign discoveries, because they are, generally speaking, all pro-
moted and carried on by trade" (175). The cosmopolitan skills of this 
tradesman/merchant are more valuable in the end than martial ones, 
since England's glory is not to be found in conquest and subjection, 
but in the achievements in commerce both at home and abroad. 
Defoe's pairing of peace and commerce requires that he describe 
the condition of war in which commercial relationships are threat-
ened by greed, ambition and violence. War and savagery are figured 
not only in the cannibal practices of the New World, but also in the 
self-interest of financial men who feed off the national debt and in the 
gluttony of those European states who consume all the wealth of their 
American colonies in bullion rather than opening these colonies up 
to trade. In his account of the South Sea disaster, the national body 
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nourished by trade becomes the victim of stockjobbers and "man-eat-
ing discounters."16 The Complete English Tradesman argues that coun-
tries which gobble up their colonial territories, absorbing the native 
peoples into the body of the parent nation, put their own resources 
under strain. By planting and settling colonies in "the uninhabited 
islands, and in the uncultivated continent of America" (180, my em-
phasis) , England, on the other hand, ensures a market for the super-
fluities of British manufacture at the same time as it brings home a 
revenue in plantation goods like sugar, cotton, and tobacco. What is 
striking about Defoe's description of this economy is the way that both 
"original" occupation and plantation labor seem to remain so inno-
cent of the acts of colonial violence which frame them. They are able 
to appear so as long as Defoe opposes peace and industry to treachery 
and war: 
We have not increased our power, or the number of our subjects, by subduing the 
nations which possess those countries, and incorporating them into our own; but 
have entirely planted our colonies, and peopled the countries with our own 
subjects, natives of this island; and excepting the Negroes, which we transport from 
Africa to America, as slaves to work in the sugar and tobacco plantations, all our 
colonies, as well in the islands as on the continent of America, are intirely peopled 
from Great Britain and Ireland, and chiefly the former; the natives having either 
removed farther up into the country, or, by their own folly and treachery raising 
war against us, been destroyed and cut off. (180) 
Unbloated by the incorporation of subdued foreign peoples, a lean 
Britain prides itself on the populating and cultivating of hitherto 
unproductive lands. Its treatment of the Indians whom it has either 
dispossessed or destroyed does not offend natural law since no 
unjust act of war has been committed—the offense has been that of 
the "aggressor" natives. The amicable trading partners here are 
Britain and its colony; slaves and savages diversify the population of 
the colony but do not in themselves constitute rival nations or, 
indeed, properly subject peoples. 
I will now consider how The Farther Adventures explores this violent 
scene of contact where the law of nations has little or no jurisdiction. 
The colony in Crusoe's story turns out to be a troubled site for the law, 
since his contact with pre-commercial peoples combined with his willed 
separation from his home country renders him in many ways as "na-
tionless" as his savage subjects. His story before this has been a Hob-
besian one. In the first part of Robinson Crusoevrt saw him transformed 
from settler/planter into absolute sovereign, answerable neither to 
his subjects, nor to any higher power: even God's authority here is fi-
nally identified with his own.17 In The Farther Adventures he discovers 
that this authority is determined in part by his weak sense of national 
identity—a discovery confirmed later in the novel when he is identi-
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fied by Dutch merchants as an international outlaw. As he re-enters 
the commercial world and discovers his hitherto buried attachment 
to his home, he begins to think of "savages" less as his natural subjects 
than as isolated peoples whose failure to develop commercial relation-
ships with others deprives them of the protection of natural law and 
cosmopolitan right. 
At the beginning of The Life and Adventures we learn that Crusoe's 
father was a foreigner from Bremen who settled at Hull where he made 
a good fortune "by Merchandise" (3). He then retired to York where 
he married into a good family (the Robinsons), so bringing foreign 
blood and the profits of trade (what both the True Born Englishman and 
Complete English Tradesman have argued constitute the substance and 
strength of the nation) to the landed classes. Crusoe's own career is 
rather the reverse of this. He sets out from England each time, not as 
a merchant, but as an adventurer, and hence his return home (between 
parts I and II of Robinson Crusoe) is not the happy reward of a life of 
industry, but rather a "part" settlement {Life, 305), which is inevitably 
disturbed by a resdess desire to travel abroad again. At the beginning 
of The Farther Adventures Crusoe confesses to a continuing "propensity 
to rambling" (1), despite his now having "no fortune to make" and 
"nothing to seek." His obsessive desire to see his plantation and the 
colony he had left on the island is only moderated by his wife, whose 
distressed recognition of the way that this "impulse of Providence" (4) 
works upon him brings to his mind the absurdity of wanting to ex-
change, in his declining years, an easy and happy life for one of hard-
ship and suffering. On his wife's death, however, this comfortable life 
of retirement becomes suddenly so desolate that he feels "as much a 
stranger in the world . . . as I was in the Brasils" (8). Reversing the pat-
tern of his father's life and career, Crusoe leaves a comfortable retire-
ment to go back to sea, though once again not as a merchant but as 
a solitary adventurer. 
Once he returns to the island we are reminded of how, in the first 
part of his story, the trials and successes of his solitary life were com-
plicated by his encounter with the cannibals and consequently by 
questions of law and government. Cannibalism, for the older Crusoe 
as well as for the younger, signifies the absence of law. While he has 
been gone hostilities have repeatedly broken out in the colony, both 
between the Spaniards and the English mutineers whom he settled 
there, and between all these and the neighboring savages who have 
reportedly visited the island on cannibal raids. Although they repelled 
these attacks and managed to take number of slaves, the Spaniards have 
not been able to educate these peoples out of their anthropophagic hab-
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its, and while faithful as slaves, none are quite as dependable as Friday 
who, Crusoe recalls with a ghoulish reference to cannibalism, "was as 
true to me as the very flesh upon my bones" (69). These slaves cannot 
be trusted with knowing anything of the plantations, since they 
threaten to escape and bring their fellow invaders back to the island. 
This constant state of uncertainty is exacerbated by the lack of firm 
government on the island. Despite their having survived so many at-
tacks, the Spaniards lack Crusoe's economic and political initiative: 
where he enclosed land, built up a store of goods, and established sov-
ereignty over all the other inhabitants of the island, they have re-
mained hungry, dejected, and fearful for their lives. All that is to be 
found on this island, they complain, are "a few roots and herbs . . . 
which ha[ve] no substance in them, and which the inhabitants g[i]ve 
them sparingly enough, and who could treat them no better, unless 
they would turn cannibals and each mens flesh which was the great 
dainty of their country" (128). They are so dependent on the native 
peoples for their survival that they are not only unable to assert author-
ity over them, but also haunted by the threat that they too might turn 
cannibal, going native in a manner that would finally and fully sepa-
rate them from their civilized pasts. 
This state of lawlessness is reversed with Crusoe's return. Several 
striking descriptions of encounters with cannibals in The Farther Adven-
tures demonstrate how easily he once again assumes absolute author-
ity, both as governor of the island and as narrator. He reports the first 
of these encounters second-hand. The three renegade Englishmen 
whose crimes included destroying the Spanish plantations, attacking 
one of the Indian slaves, and intending to murder all the Spaniards 
in their sleep, he tells us, were permitted by the Spaniards to leave the 
island with several firearms and travel to the mainland. On what 
turned out not to be the mainland at all but an adjacent island, they 
met with a "courteous and friendly" (83) people who supplied them 
with whatever they appeared to need, including sixteen of the two 
hundred prisoners taken in war who were being fattened for a coming 
feast. The third-hand narrator of this story (having been told it by the 
Spanish Governor who heard it from the Englishmen themselves), 
Crusoe remarks that "as brutish and barbarous as these fellows were 
at home, their stomachs turn'd at this s ight . . . [but] to refuse the pris-
oners would have been the highest affront to the savage gentry" (84). 
They decided therefore to accept the prisoners and to return to the 
island before they were expected to kill and devour their "gift." On the 
journey home they tried to communicate their good intentions to 
their captives, but every sign they made was interpreted as an indica-
tion that the Englishmen were about to murder them, and every offer 
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of food as an attempt to fatten them up for the kill. Finally, with the 
help of Friday's father, they were brought to understand to their joy 
that they had fallen into the hands of Christians, who abhorred the 
eating of human flesh, and that they were to be made into servants, 
and, in the case of the women prisoners, wives to the English settlers. 
These proved to be "willing, quiet, passive, and subjected creatures, 
rather like slaves than wives" (90). 
This incident is interesting both because the fear of cannibalism is 
expressed on both sides, and because its resolution takes the form of 
embracing of the new slaves into the "family" (126) of colonists which 
Crusoe has rejoined as head. Although the encounters with both the 
people of the cannibal island and their prisoners are only minimally 
comprehensible to the Englishmen, who interpret the meaning and 
feelings of the Indians through their gestures and expressions, their 
Christian disgust at the practices of this culture enables Crusoe to identify 
their civilized distance from the savages, and to represent them as fully 
aware of the nature of the miscomprehensions of the latter, even as the 
savages read every movement of the foreigners as if they were no dif-
ferent from themselves.18 This is in striking contrast to a later episode 
where Crusoe reveals his ignorance about Indian cultures, and informs 
Will Atkins, who from his wife knows better, that they have no incest 
taboo. Since the scene with the cannibals is presented retrospectively, 
however, the epistemological confusion which attended these earlier 
encounters with savages is repaired by informed cultural distance, and 
the Englishmen are brought back into the Christian family fold, which 
they had willfully left earlier by acting like savages and ruining the 
plantations of their more industrious countrymen (two mutineers who 
had fled Crusoe's departing ship at the last minute and joined those 
whom he had already settled on the island). Crusoe's description of 
the colony—Spaniards, English, and Indian slaves—is of the single 
family under his authority which the Spaniards in his absence were un-
able to establish. That is to say, the colonists are properly able to over-
come their differences only when Crusoe returns as sovereign and 
finds of the subjects that meet him that "it was impossible to guess what 
nation they were o f ' (43). They greet him, he says, "one by one, not 
as if they had been sailors and ordinary fellows, and I the like, but re-
ally as if they had been ambassadors of noblemen, and I a monarch 
or a great conqueror; their behaviour was to the last degree obliging 
and courteous, and yet mix'd with a manly, majestick gravity" (43). 
Although the colonists surrender their national differences, and to-
gether with their slaves once more become civilized subjects of 
Crusoe's patriarchal rule, the figure of cannibalism is not quite erased 
on the side of the Europeans. On his journey to the island Crusoe res-
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cues the company and passengers of a ship of Bristol that has lost its 
masts in a hurricane. Having used up all their provisions (and the pas-
sengers having none of their own to begin with) these have either 
starved, or nearly starved to death. The passengers join his ship, and 
later tell him in detail of the experience of extreme hunger which, 
Crusoe reflects, "knows no friend, no Justice, no Right, and therefore 
is remorseless, and capable of no compassion" (236). This observation 
is borne out when later in the novel he learns/reports the full story 
of the maid who faced starvation with her mistress. Where the latter 
had given her last piece of bread to her son, the maid is so "ravenous 
and furious with hunger" (201) that she imagines that had she had a 
child its life might not have been safe with her: "had my mistress been 
dead, as much as I lov'd her, I am certain, I should have eaten a piece 
of her flesh, with as much relish, and as unconcern'd, as ever I did the 
flesh of any creature appointed for food; and once or twice I was going 
to bite my own arm" (201-2). Crusoe rescues these people from their 
desperate isolation just as he did Friday and the Spaniard from the 
cannibals, and the captain from the mutineers. Had not his ship so 
providentially found them, he reflects, "a few days more would have 
ended all their lives, unless they had prevented it by eating one an-
other" (204). This might simply be another parable about isolation 
and the state of war, except that it is told so differently from other ac-
counts of European savagery in this novel. Here Crusoe presents the 
maid's story not in his words, as he did with the Englishmen's cannibal 
encounter, but in hers: "This was her own relation," he comments, 
"and is such a distinct account of starving to death, as I confess I never 
met with, and was exceedingly entertaining to me; I am the rather apt 
to believe it to be a true account because the youth gave me an account 
of a good part of it" (203). His civilizing reordering and interpreting 
of events is replaced here by enthralled observation and an effort to 
verify the truth of such an extraordinary tale. Crusoe has no need to 
establish narrative authority here; he can simply record the story as it 
is told to him because in this case the cannibal figure presents no 
threat to his sovereignty. Although the maid's story seems to nullify 
the civilized distance which Crusoe has been so careful to establish be-
tween the criminal English and the cannibals, in fact it points out how 
assertively and selectively Crusoe's narrative makes civilized subjects 
of the occupants of the island, who need to be drawn into his "family" 
in order for the colony to survive. Both his interpretive and his sover-
eign authority at this point remain intact, compromised neither by a 
Providential narrative, as they were in his earlier adventures on the is-
land, nor by any secular expression of natural law. 
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The Farther Adventures does not encounter narrative skepticism, 
then, in the distance between journal and Providential script as occurs 
in the first part of The Life and Adventures, nor even in the oddly con-
tradictory way in which Crusoe is correcting of some "savage" forms 
of behavior, and detachedly "entertained" by others. For this reason, 
in the preface Defoe can dismiss "all the endeavours of envious people 
to reproach [the work] with being a romance, to search it for errors 
in geography, inconsistency in the relation, and contradictions in the 
fact" (A3). It is only after he leaves the island that his reflections on 
the nature of his experiences begins to diverge from his journalistic 
descriptions of them. 
In The Life and Adventures, Crusoe's refusal to accept the middle sta-
tion of life, his willing himself into misfortune, is proven to be part of 
a larger providential plan when he returns at the end of the novel to 
England and family life with a sizable estate from the sale of his plan-
tation. In The Farther Adventures he leaves the island not to return to 
his native land, but to wander on through the east, having rather im-
properly re-established, he now seems to reflect, his absolute/pater-
nal authority where he should, like a good merchant, have taken out 
a patent in the name of England and shipped goods back from the col-
ony. Reversing the pattern of the first adventures, Crusoe's reflections 
become increasingly less authoritative, and his identity less secure. 
When, after assuming an authority on the ship that he does not have 
and exciting the hostility of both crew and captain, he is put ashore 
on the coast of Arabia, he reflects that he is "alone in the remotest part 
of the world . . . near three thousand leagues by sea farther off f rom 
England than I was at my island" (246). He must consider how to travel 
overland back to Britain, since, having no connection with the East 
India Company—either the captains of the ships or the company's 
factors—he cannot get passage aboard an English ship. This sudden 
yearning for home almost turns him from explorer into merchant. An 
English merchant with whom he takes lodging suggests that they take 
a trading voyage to China together, and while Crusoe admits that trade 
is not his element, he confesses that after some debate with his com-
panion he begins "to be a convert to the principles of merchandizing," 
and to "conquer [his] backwardness" (252). Merchandizing, "a covet-
ous desire of getting" in the world, rather than a "restless desire of see-
ing" it (250), a set of private ambitions which through the directions 
of nature contributes to the larger wealth of the nation, is not only a mod-
ern achievement which makes Crusoean sovereignty look economically 
outdated. It is also in keeping with the laws of Providence, which hum-
ble Crusoe's narrative before the greater plan of God: "Let no wise 
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man flatter himself with the strength of his own judgment Man is 
a shortsighted creature, sees but a very little way before him" (218). 
Isolation and homesickness are not to be so easily remedied, how-
ever. Crusoe and the merchant, having decided to take home a load-
ing of cloves from the Manilas, have not long been at sea when they 
learn that the ship they have purchased from a Dutch captain was a 
pirate vessel, and that they are now thought to be international out-
laws, the enemies both of Dutch and of English ships. Should they be 
caught, they will have no opportunity to give an account of themselves, 
but shall be "hang'd first andjudged afterward" (263), for "merchants 
ships shew but little law to pirates, if they get them into their power" 
(257). Crusoe, who has been absolute ruler and judge of his subjects, 
and whose narrative authority has made clear the difference between 
warring savage and civilized subject, suddenly finds himself repre-
sented as the former without any right of self-defense. Much as his 
authority might have had the weight of Providence behind it on the 
island, once he leaves he discovers that it has no currency in an inter-
national arena, and that if he is no merchant, and if he is "nationless" 
in the sense that I have described above, then he will probably be taken 
for a pirate and a barbarian. He reflects, as he once did, shipwrecked 
and alone on the island, that "nothing makes mankind so compleatly 
miserable, as that of being in constant fear" (282), and then that he 
would rather be captured by cannibals than by his accusers, who will 
glut their rage upon him with "inhuman tortures and barbarities" (286). 
Now that he is thrust into a violent state of nature it becomes unclear 
who is the savage. The epistemological certainty of his account of the 
cannibal prisoners' mistaken fear of the English has no place here. In 
the state of war each party mirrors the cruelty and barbarism of the other. 
Perhaps the most striking change of heart in Crusoe's narrative oc-
curs towards the end of the novel when he is traveling back to Europe 
overland through Asia. Although this is primarily a journey home 
rather than a trading venture, Crusoe ends up traveling in the com-
pany of a great many merchants of several nations including Musco-
vites, Poles, and Scots, and himself in fact procures in Peking a cargo 
of silks, tea, calicoes, and "three camels loads of nutmegs and cloves" 
(308). His conversion to mercantilism is accompanied by a developing 
horror of what he calls "wilderness." Apparently forgetting already 
how recently he himself was marked as a nationless outlaw, Crusoe 
identifies entirely with his merchant fellow travelers in his fear of this 
lawless wild over which no nation clearly has dominion. The Scots mer-
chant warns him of the Tartars that they have no knowledge of letters 
or of any other language; that they live in a "wretched ignorance" (332). 
They are subjected to the Czar of Muscovy's dominions—lacking both 
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sovereign identity and knowledge of other languages and customs, 
they are necessarily violent and brutish. 
When Crusoe was abandoned by his nephew's ship on the coast of 
Arabia his desire to return to England was combined with a righteous 
sense of how barbarically the crew had treated the native peoples 
whom they encountered at Madagascar. In revenge for the murder of 
one of their number who raped a native woman, the men of the ship 
set fire to the village and murdered as many of its inhabitants as they 
could find. Crusoe described this as a "rage altogether barbarous" and 
a "fury, something beyond what was human" (234). The Crusoe who 
acted in this episode, as he did on the island, as master, judge, civilizer, 
and protective father, has been replaced in the later half of the novel 
by a merchant figure whose attitude toward the Tartars is determined 
by his contempt for subjugated peoples who live in an isolated state 
of nature and who are incapable of communication or commerce with 
other nations. Horrified by idol worship and determined to "vindicate 
the honor of God" (Farther Adventures, 332), he proposes stealing an 
idol and leaving those who worship it an explanation of his reasons 
for doing so. Having reminded him that they cannot read or understand 
his language, the Scots merchant then tells him the story of a Russian 
who tried to interrupt them in their worship and was sacrificed to their 
idol for his pains. To this Crusoe responds with extraordinary vio-
lence: 'Well, says I, I'll tell you a story: so I related the story of our men 
at Madagascar, and how they burnt and sack'd the village there, and 
kill'd man, woman and child, for their murdering one of our men, just 
as it is related before; and when I had done, I added, that I thought 
we ought to do so to this village" (333). 
Crusoe conspicuously offers no reflection on this change of attitude. 
Neither the final interpretive authority that he demonstrates on the 
island, nor the self-doubting narrative anxiety that he experiences on 
leaving it, are available to mediate this contradiction. His violent plan 
is simply presented as the logical one in a land where the people are 
isolated, ignorant and pagan, in a "wild uncultivated country" (347) 
where, we have already learnt, there are no safe routes for traders to 
follow. Tyrannical surveillance and barbarism are finally left behind 
when on the eastern border they are met by a merchant Hamburgher, 
and, since "the city of Hamburgh might happen to be as good a market 
for our goods as London" (372), they happily take freight with him. 
Crusoe's final reflection in The Farther Adventures is on his at last hav-
ing learnt "the value of retirement and the blessing of ending our days 
in peace" (373). The peace of having finally abandoned the life of a 
wanderer, and returned home to a sober later life like that of his fa-
ther, is, I have tried to argue here, tied also to a concept of peace in 
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the sense of the operation of cosmopolitan right. The law of nations 
into which Crusoe is educated in the course of the novel belongs to 
an enlightenment historicization of culture according to which those 
peoples capable of commercial intercourse are legitimate members of 
the community of nations, while those who are not are criminals against 
nature who cannot be bearers of right. To subjugate such peoples and 
to set oneself up as their absolute ruler and master is to become de-
nationalized and dangerously removed from commercial culture. To 
make war on isolated savages and pagans in the name of cosmopolitan 
right and the freedom of trade, however, is to be at once profitable, 
lawful, and in the most strictly modern sense, English. 
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